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Abstract
Does moral culture contribute to the evolution of cooperation? Here, we examine individuals’ and
communities’ models of what it means to be good and bad and how they correspond to corollary
behavior across a variety of socioecological contexts. Our sample includes over 600 people from
eight different field sites that include foragers, horticulturalists, herders, and the fully market-
reliant. We first examine the universals and particulars of explicit moral models. We then use
these moral models to assess their role in the outcome of an economic experiment designed to
detect systematic, dishonest rule-breaking favoritism. We show that individuals are slightly more
inclined to play by the rules when their moral models include the task-relevant virtues of “honesty”
and “dishonesty.” We also find that religious beliefs are better predictors of honest play than
these virtues. The predictive power of these values’ and beliefs’ local prevalence, however, remains
inconclusive. In summary, we find that religious beliefs and moral models may help promote honest
behavior that may widen the breadth of human cooperation.
Keywords: morality, cross-cultural ethnography, cognitive anthropology, evolution of cooperation
1. Introduction
Many theories hold that socially learned moral norms are the lynchpin for the remarkable
breadth of cooperation that humans uniquely exhibit (Bowles and Gintis, 2003; Boyd, 2017; Boyd
and Richerson, 2009; Chudek and Henrich, 2011; Richerson et al., 2016). However, there are a few
critical outstanding issues that make this view difficult to endorse with a confidence borne out by
direct empirical evidence. First, it is not immediately obvious that individuals’ and groups’ moral
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prescriptions actually influence the behavior of those who espouse them (e.g., Graham et al., 2015;
Haidt, 2001; Perry, 2017; Smith et al., 2013). When moral prescriptions and behavior are consistent
with each other, moral prescriptions might simply be rationalizations of behavior rather than causes
(e.g., Baumard, 2016; Haidt, 2001). Second, despite the fact that so many emphasize (or minimize)
the importance of culture for human cooperation, few actually measure its effects directly and model
it as a distributed, superordinate property of social life (see Smaldino, 2014). Most empirical studies
consider culture indirectly by either: a) having participants in economic experiments make an
allocation with money and then asking what the appropriate decision was (e.g., Gurven et al., 2008;
Ensminger and Henrich, 2014; Henrich and Henrich, 2014), b) framing experimental introductions
in locally salient ways (e.g., Brodbeck et al., 2013; Cohn et al., 2014; Cronk, 2007; Lesorogol, 2007;
Gerkey, 2013; Stagnaro et al., 2017), or c) conducting studies across multiple groups, and concluding
that cross-cultural variation in behavior reflects underlying variation in culture (e.g., Apicella et al.,
2012; Henrich, 2000; Henrich et al., 2004; Roth et al., 1991). Third, many cross-cultural studies
emphasizing the evolved psychology underlying morality rely heavily on theoretically-motivated
scale designs (e.g., Curry et al., n.d.; Graham et al., 2011) that a) use items lacking in local relevance,
b) are impractical for innumerate and/or nonliterate populations, c) presuppose that samples have
the lexical equivalent of “moral,” and d) do not link this data to quantitative behavior.
Here, we seek to overcome these limitations by measuring moral culture from a variety of
societies and examine whether or not moral values and their distributions actually have an impact on
the kind of broader cooperation typified by humans. We first briefly spell out our assumptions and
introduce contemporary evolutionary perspectives on moral systems, followed by a more detailed
assessment of the aforementioned limitations. We then introduce our two studies. The first consists
of an analysis of systematically collected ethnographic data regarding what it means to be “good”
and “bad” across eight different field sites. In doing so, we examine cross-cultural moral universals
and local particulars. The second study uses this data to examine its contribution to corresponding
behavior in an experimental game designed to distinguish dishonest favoritism from impartial,
rule-following fairness. We conclude with a discussion of our studies’ limitations and comment on
avenues for further inquiry.
2. Background
2.1. Defining moral systems
We refer to “moral models” here as the content and structure of individuals’ explicit repre-
sentations of moral norms. If we adopt the view that “culture” is shared, socially transmitted
information (cf. Boyd and Richerson, 1988; D’Andrade, 1981; Sperber, 1996), then moral culture is
the shared, socially transmitted units that comprise individual moral models. Defined in this fash-
ion, local prevalence of particular units of socially transmitted information indicates how “cultural”
or “normative” those units are. In this view, then, directly assessing whether or not culture influ-
ences individual behavior requires: 1) detailing individuals’ models, 2) assessing how widespread
the content of those models is in individuals’ social groups, 3) examining the relationship between
a behavioral trait and an individuals’ models, and 4) examining the relationship between the trait
and how prevalent specific informational units are in one’s group. The first two requirements are
descriptive, ethnographic accounts of moral culture. The latter most two allow us to disambiguate
the relative impacts of individual and cultural models of morality on behavior. If moral culture
predicts moral behavior, then the prevalence of moral models’ constituent units in a group should
covary with the target behavior.
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We use “moral systems” here to refer to moral models, their psychological underpinnings,
behavioral expressions, cultural prevalence, and the causal links between them (cf. Alexander,
1987; Haidt and Kesebir, 2010; Kiper and Sosis, 2014). Classical philosophical and contemporary
social psychological views of moral systems emphasize universality and/or the view that morality is
associated with abstract notions like “justice” and “rights” (Caton, 1963; Kant, 1997 [1785]; Turiel,
1983, 2006). In contrast, many evolutionary views boil down moral systems to the regulation of
cooperative and/or mutualistic endeavors that generate individual- and/or group-level benefits
(Alexander, 1987; Baumard et al., 2013; Barrett et al., 2016; Cosmides and Tooby, 2005; Cronk,
1994; Curry, 2016; Darwin, 1871; Greene, 2013; Fehr et al., 2002; Haidt and Kesebir, 2010; Machery
and Mallon, 2010; Mizzoni, 2009; Sripada and Stich, 2006; Trivers, 1971; Tomasello and Vaish,
2013). However, there is considerable variation in moral systems, variation that many suggest are
inconsequential or run counter to such generalist theories (Baumard, 2016; Boehm, 1980; Buchtel
et al., 2015; Fessler et al., 2015; Schwartz, 2007; Shweder et al., 1997; Smith et al., 2007). As we
detail below, piecing together the constituent parts of moral systems in a cross-cultural empirical
project remains a major challenge in the evolutionary literature.
2.2. Measuring components of moral systems
2.2.1. Evolutionary psychology of morality
Contemporary evolutionary psychological research focused on mapping the conceptual space
of morality typically relies on scale items (Curry et al., n.d.; Graham et al., 2011) with prefabri-
cated materials that are verified externally (i.e., using other scales). For example, seeking to better
operationalize the moral domain with attention to cross-cultural validity, the popular “Moral Foun-
dations” literature breaks down the evolutionary and cognitive “foundations” of morality into a few
core dimensions. While the rubric itself has evolved (Graham et al., 2013), the most recent iteration
includes: (1) harm/care; (2) fairness/reciprocity; (3) ingroup/loyalty; (4) authority/respect, and
(5) purity/sanctity as foundational to moral reasoning. The more recent “Morality-as-Cooperation”
literature (Curry, 2016; Curry et al., n.d.) measures seven types of cooperation treated as the foun-
dations for moral behavior: (1) family values; (2) group loyalty; (3) reciprocity; (4) dominance; (5)
deference; (6) fairness; and (7) rights to property.
These rubrics were not designed to assess the relationship between moral culture and behavior.
Rather, they seek to identify variation in moral reasoning as indicated by variation in how survey
items load onto principal components and how mean values of scales vary across different groups.
There are practical and methodological reasons to be reluctant to employ scale-based surveys in
populations where they were not designed. First, many traditions lack the lexical equivalent of
“morality.” Second, some samples struggle with scale-based survey instruments. While convenient
for researchers, in practice, scale items can be quite taxing and unintuitive for non-literate and/or
innumerate participants (e.g., Gurven et al., 2013). Third, such instruments are often limited in
local relevance. For example, the “Moral Foundations Questionnaire” (Graham et al., 2011) in-
cludes questions about whether or not “being good at math,” having “love for one’s country,”
being “denied rights,” and “God’s approval” are “relevant to [participants’] moral thinking” or to
their sense of right and wrong. Such items and the notion of “moral relevance” are simply unin-
telligible in many contexts. Ideally, scale design in cross-cultural research begins with preliminary
ethnographic inquiry to ensure that scale items are actually measuring target constructs (Bernard,
2011; Handwerker, 2001). Indeed, Smith et al. (2007) found that other theory-driven classification
schemes inadequately captured the variation in folk-models of what it means to be “good” in seven
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different communities. Boehm (1980) imported a morality metric to Montenegro, but due to par-
ticipants’ initial off-target responses to the metric, he had to assess features of local moral behavior
with open-ended questions.
2.2.2. Cultural evolutionary ecology of moral behavior
Those who emphasize culture’s effects on cooperative behavior typically employ economic ex-
perimental games as an index of cooperation, but do not directly measure or model “culture.”
Some appeal to the importance of cultural institutions (i.e., shared pools of norms that constrain
human interactions in specific, socially demarcated contexts; see D’Andrade 2006; North 1991;
Searle 1995) by manipulating the cultural relevance of experiments’ instructions in the form of
framing effects (Brodbeck et al., 2013; Cohn et al., 2014; Cronk, 2007; Lesorogol, 2007; Gerkey,
2013). Others conduct experiments and infer that culture contributes to the evolution of coopera-
tion by virtue of statistical divergences between groups in experimental game outcomes (Apicella
et al., 2012; Ensminger and Henrich, 2014; Henrich, 2000; Henrich et al., 2004; Roth et al., 1991). A
burgeoning literature that actively measures variation in cultural information focuses on religious
beliefs (McNamara et al., 2016; Johnson, 2016; Purzycki et al., 2016b). This literature typically
uses individuals’ beliefs in punitive and knowledgeable deities to predict cooperative outcomes.
However, the literature ignores the within-group distribution of religious beliefs–that is, groups’
religious culture–as a factor in individual behavior.
To the best of our knowledge, only a solitary study claims to assess the degree to which specif-
ically moral culture has an effect in cooperation (Gurven, Zanolini, and Schniter, 2008; cf. Ens-
minger and Henrich, 2014; Henrich and Henrich, 2014 for more case studies from the same cross-
cultural project). The study, which the authors characterize as “the first of its kind to show that
local culture matters in explaining variation in pro-social behavior” (pg. 589), employed a variation
of the Dictator Game in which participants were asked to identify “the morally correct offer to give
in this...game” (3). While there were a few exceptions in their sample of nine Tsimane’ (Bolivia)
villages, in general there was a positive correlation between what people thought they should do in
the game and how they actually allocated money. Note that the Tsimane’ lack a word for “moral”;
the researchers instead used ruijsis which “expresses the concept of appropriate behavior or action”
(pg. 592). The authors “argue that local differences [in cooperation] are not necessarily due to
strong norms per se that vary among villages, but due to local (unmeasured) effects that push and
pull villages towards more or less pro-social sentiment” (pg. 589). Note, however, that this study
elicited participants’ views of the “appropriate” behavior for the experiment, not more general
individual-level moral models or their distributions from which participants ostensibly drew.
In summary, while many argue about culture’s role in the expansion of cooperation, and many
examine a variety of important factors’ contributions to this process, the cooperation literature does
not directly probe the contribution of moral culture itself. Likewise, studies that have measured
variation in moral culture do not link them to corresponding behavior. Here, we attempt to
assess the relationship between individual moral models and cooperation directly, with an eye to
the aspects of local culture—moral models’ prevalence—that may serve as inputs to individual
behavior. First, we assess the degree to which there are universals and particulars of moral culture
by examining what people consider “good” and “bad” (Study 1). We then examine the respective
roles of individual moral models and culture in the allocation of money using an experimental




We collected data in eight different field sites (see table 1). These samples included: (1) the
Hadza of Tanzania; (2 and 3) inland and coastal villagers from Tanna, Vanuatu; (4) residents of
Marajó island in Brazil; (5) Fijians from Yasawa island; (6) Indo-Fijians from Lovu; (7) Tyvan
residents in Kyzyl, Tyva Republic; and (8) Indo-Mauritian residents of Porte aux Piment. Our
sample is notably diverse; modes of subsistence range from the foraging Hadza and horticultural
inland Tannese to the fully market-integrated economies of Kyzyl and Porte aux Piment.
Site/Sample Researcher Sampling Method World Religion Economy
Coastal Tanna Atkinson Cluster sampling (census) Christianity Horticulture/Market
Hadza Apicella Entire camps None Foraging
Inland Tanna Atkinson Entire community None Horticulture
Lovu, Fiji Willard Door-to-door Hinduism Market
Mauritians Xygalatas Random (street) sampling Hinduism Farming/Market
Marajó, Brazil Cohen Random sampling (census) Christianity Market
Tyva Republic Purzycki Random and chain sampling (street) Buddhism Herding/Market
Yasawa, Fiji McNamara Door-to-door Christianity Horticulture/Market
Table 1: Descriptive features of each field site. See Purzycki et al. (2016a) and supplements for further details.
This sample exhibits some of the considerable cross-cultural diversity known to cultural an-
thropology; our participants range from the fully market-integrated (e.g., Mauritians and Marajó
Brazilians) to subsistence foragers and horticulturalists (e.g., the Hadza and Inland Tanna, respec-
tively). Our sample thus includes people from traditional, small-scale communities, whose means
of living are subsistence-based with daily interactions consisting primarily with local familiars as
well as urban samples where individuals regularly interact with anonymous others. Moreover, our
samples are uniquely poised for consideration of our research questions and methods. No such work
examining explicit moral models has been conducted among traditional, small-scale societies. Our
methods (see below) are particularly useful for eliciting rich and comparable ethnographic data in
innumerate and nonliterate samples often ignored or left out in studies relying on prefabricated
scales and narrow samples.
4. Study 1: Moral Culture
While not every group has the lexical equivalent of “moral,” some posit that the distinction
between “good” and “bad” is a human universal (Brown, 1991; Wierzbicka, 1994). We can assess
whether or not the content of these conceptual domains approximate morality simply by asking
people what it means to be good and bad. To reliably capture moral models and culture, we assess
freely-elicited data of what it means to be “good” and “bad” (see Buchtel et al., 2015; Purzycki,
2011, 2016; Smith et al., 2007, for precedent applications). This method allows individuals to
answer on their own terms and avoids the aforementioned pitfalls associated with a lack of cultural
relevance, the question of what measurement instruments actually measure, or the elicitation of
rationalizations of behavior.
4.1. Methods
All materials were translated in local languages and back-translated into English for corrobo-
ration and subsequent edits. To obtain reliable, naturalistic, and culturally relevant data about
morality, we asked participants to:
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• Please list up to 5 behaviors that make someone a good/virtuous/moral person.
• Please list up to 5 behaviors that make a bad/immoral person.
All free-list data were translated into English and subsequently submitted to Purzycki for compil-
ing and coding. All original open-ended responses in English and the subsequently coded data are
publicly available here https://github.com/bgpurzycki/Moral-Models-Moral-Behavior for re-
assessment, further recoding, and analysis. See supplements for further materials, methodological
notes, and per-site English translations of instructions of the free-list tasks.
4.1.1. Analysis
We analyzed the free-list data using the AnthroTools package (Jamieson-Lane and Purzycki,
2016; Purzycki and Jamieson-Lane, 2016) for R (R Core Team, 2016). This package calculates the
cognitive salience of individual free-list items and tabulates their mean salience score (Smith’s S).
These scores can be calculated at the sample- and sub-sample (i.e., field site) levels. Individual
item salience (i) is calculated with equation 1:
i =
n + 1 − k
n
(1)
where n is the total number of items an individual listed, and k is the order in which an item was
listed. Smith’s S (equation 2) is a sample’s mean value of item type (Smith, 1993; Smith et al.,






Here, we denote item type with iT and N denotes the total sample or sub-sample size (i.e., the
denominator is not limited only to those participants who listed a given item). Smith’s S will
therefore increase as a function of ubiquity and earlier placement in lists. In order to minimize
inflated Smith’s S values due to repeated items within lists, we used AnthroTools’ “MAX” function
which includes only the earliest-listed repeated item in its calculations.
It is important to note that our reported salience indices may reflect underestimations for three
reasons. First, in terms of individual item salience, participants were encouraged to list up to only
5 items per sub-domain (i.e., “good” and “bad”). If these items would have been the earliest-listed
in a task without such a constraint, all data considered here would have had much higher salience
scores. Secondly, we retain items listed by only one individual in our analysis. Dropping such
idiosyncratic items would decrease the denominator in equation 1 and therefore increase the salience
values. Thirdly, for the sake of completeness, we include those individuals who simply answered
“I don’t know” (1 participant for the “good” list and 3 for the “bad”). Though negligible, these
would inevitably have an item salience of 1 and contribute to a larger denominator in equation 2.
4.2. Results
4.2.1. Moral Universals
What constitutes a “moral” or “good” person? Participants (N = 643) listed a total of 2,478
items (MListed = 4.27, SD = 1.07) in this sub-domain. Table 2 and Figure 1 show the salience
of individually-listed items where S ≥ 0.10. We use this cut-off to minimize table lengths. Many
participants listed various items that simply re-expressed the question (e.g., good people have “good
hearts” or exhibit “good behavior”). For the purposes of analysis, these items were given the same
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code. After this, the most salient item for participants was “generosity” or “sharing,” followed by
“helpfulness” and “honesty.”
For the sake of reference and discussion, we include a post hoc coding of item types by their
corresponding categories in the Moral Foundations (Graham et al., 2011, 2013) and Morality-as-
Cooperation (Curry, 2016; Curry et al., n.d.) literatures. If we take these most salient items and
apply their equivalent label in the Foundations and Cooperation typologies, it is clear that items
in the “fairness/reciprocity” domain are the most salient. This suggests a greater cultural stability
for this “foundational” category. While “honesty” appears in the Foundations typology and ranks
among the items with the highest salience in the present free-lists, there is not a broad consensus
about honesty in the literature; others simply include honesty as another moral subdomain (Ashton
et al., 2014; Blasi, 1980; Hofmann et al., 2014) of the greater repertoire of moral foundations and the
Morality-as-Cooperation literature bypasses it. Regardless, these results are consistent with what
we would expect given the evolutionary literature’s view of morality as a system regulating social
exchange and cooperation (Alexander, 1987; Curry et al., n.d.): fairness and reciprocity loom large
in mental models of what it means to be good. “Loving” and being kind are also included. While
the Foundations literature considers this as part of the Care/Harm foundation, it is not immediately
clear how these fall within the scope of the Cooperation typology, a limitation acknowledged in
Curry et al. (n.d.).
Item Foundation Cooperation Type Salience (M) Smith’s S n
Good* — — 0.73 0.22 195
Generous/Shares Fairness/Reciprocity Reciprocity 0.64 0.18 178
Helpful Fairness/Reciprocity Reciprocity 0.59 0.17 183
Honest Honesty/Deception ? 0.69 0.14 129
Respectful Authority/Respect Group Loyalty 0.56 0.13 144
Loving Care/Harm ? 0.61 0.11 113
Kind Care/Harm ? 0.73 0.10 88
Table 2: Sample salience scores ≥ 0.10 for what makes a good person (N = 643). Salience (M) is the
average individual item salience among individuals who listed a given item, Smith’s S is the individual item salience
of the sample, and n is the number of participants listing the item. Foundation column indicates corresponding type
in the “Moral Foundations” literature, while Cooperation Type column denotes corresponding type in the “Morality-
as-Cooperation” literature. Question marks indicate possible interpretations or lack of obvious correspondence.
*Denotes clustered items such as good conscience, good behavior, good nature, good heart.
What makes an “immoral” or “bad” person? In this sub-domain, participants (N = 650) listed
2,728 items (M = 4.20, SD = 1.14). Table 3 details the top five items where S ≥ 0.10. Figure 1
illustrates the content of these models by salience. Much like the “good” data, many participants
reiterated the question in their responses (e.g., bad people exhibit “bad behavior”). Also consistent
with the evolutionary literature, “theft” is the most salient item listed across cultural groups (the
antithesis of generosity), followed by “deceit” and “violence.” Notably—and not often considered
in much of the evolutionary literature (cf. Kurzban et al., 2010; Rozin, 1999)—the use and abuse
of drugs, alcohol, and other substances are among the chief items listed in what makes a “bad”
person. It may be that people really do see the consumption of drugs and alcohol as bad in and
of itself, but they also may view intoxicants as the source of bad behavior and therefore indicative
of immoral conduct. Here too, the Foundations literature has a little more coverage than the
Morality-as-Cooperation literature.
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Item Foundation Cooperation Type Salience (M) Smith’s S n
Theft Fairness/Reciprocity Property Rights 0.71 0.26 235
Dishonest Honesty/Deception ? 0.66 0.16 156
Violent Care/Harm ? 0.65 0.15 153
Drugs/Alcohol Purity/Sanctity (?) ? 0.70 0.12 108
Bad* — — 0.71 0.11 101
Table 3: Sample salience scores ≥ 0.10 for what makes a bad person (N = 650). Salience (M) is the
average individual item salience among individuals who listed a given item, Smith’s S is the individual item salience
of the sample, and n is the number of participants listing the item. Foundation column indicates corresponding type
in the “Moral Foundations” literature, while Cooperation Type column denotes corresponding type in the “Morality-
as-Cooperation” literature. Question marks indicate possible interpretations or lack of obvious correspondence.
*Denotes clustered items such as bad conscience, bad behavior, bad nature, bad heart.
Cross-culturally, the most salient components of individuals’ mental models of morality revolve
around the provisioning of material resources in the form of generosity, helpfulness, and theft.
We might interpret honesty and dishonesty as facets of material goals as well insofar as it is
virtuous to be honest about how much others stand to gain or lose in interactions (per Ashton
et al., 2014; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013, see below). However, as is made clearer in our
examination of site-specific moral models, there is also some variation that is not immediately
related to cooperation.
4.2.2. Moral Particulars
While we presently have neither the room to contextualize each site’s specific results nor the
means to make confident inferences about why cross-cultural variation exists (i.e., we only have
8 groups and cross-sectional data), the analysis of moral particulars does indicate that patterns
in the global sample are not merely artifacts of a few groups driving the results. For the sake of
concision, we present the most salient item listed by site. Table 4 details the items with the highest
salience scores by site for the “good” free-list data. Table 5 details the items with the highest
salience scores by site for the “bad” list. More exhaustive tables are available in the supplementary
materials (Tables S1 and S2).
Site Item Foundation Cooperation Type Salience (M) Smith’s S n
Coastal Tanna Generous/Shares Fairness/Reciprocity Reciprocity 0.74 0.40 44
Hadza Loving* Care/Harm ? 0.62 0.40 69
Inland Tanna Hospitable Care/Harm Group Loyalty (?) 0.74 0.45 74
Lovu, Fiji Honest Honesty/Deception ? 0.73 0.38 79
Mauritius Speaks well Authority/Respect (?) Deference (?) 0.84 0.33 82
Marajó, Brazil Helpful Fairness/Reciprocity Reciprocity 0.70 0.18 77
Tyva Republic Honest* Honesty/Deception Reciprocity (?) 0.74 0.28 115
Yasawa, Fiji Goes to church Purity/Sanctity (?) Group Loyalty (?) 0.68 0.39 103
Table 4: Per-site items with highest salience scores for what makes a good person. Salience (M) is the
average individual item salience within individuals who listed a given item and Smith’s S is the individual item
salience of the sub-sample. Sample size (n) is site-specific sample size for sub-domain. Foundation column indicates
corresponding type in the “Moral Foundations” literature, while Cooperation Type column denotes corresponding
type in the “Morality-as-Cooperation” literature. Question marks indicate possible interpretations or lack of obvious





























Figure 1: Universal moral models. Center circle represents the domain. The most salient items in these domains
are on top with item connection weights (Smith’s S values) descending clockwise.
Across the most salient items of what constitutes good people, we find some curious idiosyn-
cracies. For instance, Indo-Mauritians listed “speaks well” (i.e., polite and considerate as opposed
to rude and obscene) earlier and more often in lists than did other groups. Notably, Indo-Fijians
(Lovu, Fiji) likewise ranked “speaks well” highly (S = 0.10) while all other sites ranked it lower
when listed at all (S values were ≤ 0.04). This suggests a distinct cultural lineage; both are Indian
diaspora populations that may have common-source value systems. Going to church was the most
salient item for Fijians from Yasawa. This particular value does not obviously fit in the Moral
Foundations or Morality-as-Cooperation rubrics and was not ranked highly at any other site. We
nevertheless suggest “foundations” or “cooperation type” into which these might be classified in
Tables 4 and 5. Likewise, in Marajó, “ignorance/arrogance” has the highest salience, although the
small Smith’s S suggests minimal consensus at this site. This term ignorante is locally nuanced,
and refers to one who ignores others’ opinions and holds their own as superior. This is also not
obviously a component of the Moral Foundations rubric. Note that for half of the sites, “theft” had
the highest salience for what constitutes a bad person; for the other half, save Marajó, group-level
salience for theft was >0.10: Hadza (S = 0.31); Mauritius (S = 0.15); Tyva Republic (S = 0.13).
Again, we refer readers to the more thorough tables in the supplementary materials.
4.2.3. Discussion
Cross-culturally, the most salient indicators of good people are generosity and sharing, helpful-
ness, and honesty. The most salient indicators of bad people are theft, dishonesty, and violence.
Theft is notable insofar as it might be construed as the antithesis of cooperation; Baumard (2016)
characterizes it as “violating the logic of balanced interests” (126). These items largely correspond
to rubrics offered by the Foundations and Cooperation literatures, but a closer look at site-specific
moral models appear to complicate those rubrics insofar as articulateness, religious piety, drug and
alcohol use and abuse, and ignorance and arrogance are not consistently considered. Aside from il-
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Site Item Foundation Cooperation Type Salience (M) Smith’s S n
Coastal Tanna Theft Fairness/Reciprocity Property Rights 0.76 0.46 44
Hadza Murder Care/Harm ? 0.52 0.34 69
Inland Tanna Theft Fairness/Reciprocity Property Rights 0.76 0.37 78
Lovu, Fiji Theft Fairness/Reciprocity Property Rights 0.82 0.36 79
Mauritius Violence Care/Harm ? 0.65 0.30 84
Marajó Ignorance/Arrogance Authority/Respect (?) Deference (?) 0.69 0.14 76
Tyva Republic Dishonest Honesty/Deception ? 0.70 0.35 117
Yasawa, Fiji Theft Fairness/Reciprocity Property Rights 0.80 0.33 103
Table 5: Per-site items with highest salience scores for what makes a bad person. Salience (M) is the
average individual item salience within individuals who listed a given item and Smith’s S is the individual item
salience of the sub-sample. Sample size (n) is site-specific sample size for sub-domain. Foundation column indicates
corresponding type in the “Moral Foundations” literature, while Cooperation Type column denotes corresponding
type in the “Morality-as-Cooperation” literature. Question marks indicate possible interpretations or lack of obvious
correspondence.
lustrating their limited breadth and narrow focus, our data pose little problem for the approaches;
we are explicitly measuring representational models of morality rather than moral reasoning or
judgment of a particular behavior. That said, it does suggest that the methods used in this litera-
ture have not captured some potentially informative variation found in cultural representations of
what it means to be (im)moral.
While the above results map cross-cultural models of morality for eight populations, one re-
maining question is whether or not the content and ubiquity of moral models affect behavior. To
assess this, we examined the effects of the presence and cognitive salience of honesty or dishonesty
on a behavioral economic experiment that measured systematic and partial allocations. We pre-
dicted that in a game that measures dishonest favoritism indicative of systematic rule-breaking,
the cognitive salience of “honesty” and “dishonesty” should predict fairer play. In other words,
by measuring whether an individual’s moral model includes honesty and dishonesty, we can assess
his or her resistance to the opportunity to cheat. To assess the impact of moral culture, we also
modeled group-level cultural prevalence of these components.
5. Study 2: Moral Behavior
5.1. Methods
5.1.1. Economic experiment
To measure honest behavior, we had participants play an economic game designed to detect
dishonest favoritism (Cohn et al., 2014; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Hruschka et al., 2014;
Jiang, 2013; McNamara et al., 2016; Purzycki et al., 2016b). In this experiment, participants have
a stack of 30 coins, a fair 6-sided, 2-colored die, and two cups designated for a specific individual.
They think of which cup they want to put a coin into and then they roll the die. If one pre-
designated color appears, they are supposed to put the coin into the cup they thought of. If the
other color appears, they are supposed to put the coin into the cup opposite the one they thought
of. They repeat this until all 30 coins are in cups. They make these decisions alone without any
outside observers. Regardless of individual decisions, coins should be randomly allocated to either
cup if participants follow instructions. However, since participants play alone, they can allocate
more coins to the cup of their preference.
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In our study, participants played two counterbalanced games, each with two cup dyads. The
“Local Community Game” included one cup reserved for an anonymous co-ethnic, co-religionist
in the participant’s local community and one was for an anonymous, geographically distant co-
religionist who was also a co-ethnic by default. In the “Self Game,” one cup was reserved for
the player and the other cup for another anonymous co-ethnic, co-religious individual in the same
specified geographically distant region. Players got to keep the money that went into their own cups
and we distributed all allocations to randomly-selected individuals designated by the other cups.
Here, the geographically distant players function as an index of the kind of broader cooperation
that is unique to humans; as participants are not likely to ever interact with these distant players,
playing according to the rules indicates an unwillingness to favor themselves or their community.
Show-up fees for participation were ∼25% of the average daily wage in our field sites. We set
aggregate stakes at roughly a single day’s wage (x) where individual die rolls were worth the closest
coin in value to: x/number of games played/30 coins. Coins were real currency in each site except
for the Hadza who played with tokens each worth 8 oz. (∼226.80g) maize. All participants were
tested for game comprehension and knew that all coins would be distributed to those designated
by the cups, including themselves. Only participants who passed the comprehension questions are
included in this data set.
After experiments, participants answered a host of interview questions, including the aforemen-
tioned free-list tasks. Note that in experiments were predominantly those who completed free-list
tasks, but there a few who did not complete free-lists or cases where individuals who participated
in free-list tasks did not participate in experiments. They were also asked what they thought
the experiment was about; their open-ended responses were coded for whether they mentioned
cheating, fairness, or honesty. Participation took a total of ∼90 minutes, with the free-list task
typically taking place ∼15 minutes after the game. Briefly, there are at least five reasons why this
ordering had no effect on free-list outcomes: 1) free-list tasks were after demographic surveys, 2)
the game check question is not correlated with listing (dis)honesty, 3) some sites simply did not
list (dis)honesty frequently, 4) previous research (Smith et al., 2007) not using experiments in this
fashion shows that listing “honest” is quite prevalent cross-culturally, and 5) comparing the data
from one site with and without the experiment shows no indication of games having an effect (see
Supplementary section 2.4 for more details).
All methods, materials, and data are available online at https://github.com/bgpurzycki/
Moral-Models-Moral-Behavior.
5.1.2. Does moral culture matter?
If moral models contribute to the expansion of cooperation, listing (dis)honesty should predict
playing by the rules. Participants who mention (dis)honesty will be more likely to allocate coins
to the cup benefiting the recipient more socially distant from themselves—that is, someone non-
local (as opposed to someone local), or someone other than the participant him- or herself. If
the cognitive accessibility of task-relevant components of moral models is also important to the
expansion of cooperation, we should see that salience of listing (dis)honesty increasing the chances
of allocating coins as well. If moral culture contributes to the expansion of cooperation, then
within-sample ubiquity of (dis)honesty in moral models should also have an effect on individual
behavior. In other words, while an individual’s moral model may induce fairer behavior, living in
a context where more people share similar moral values–along with the expected repercussions of
violating those values–should also contribute to the likelihood of playing honestly. Conversely, if
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moral culture evolves in response to local problems, it may actually be associated with more self-
interested behavior. Previous work we build upon shows that individual-level beliefs about morally
concerned gods’ punishment and knowledge breadth (i.e., omniscience) predicted allocations to the
distant play (Purzycki et al., 2016b). By the same logic, then, the more one’s community claims
that morally concerned deities know and punish people, the more likely individuals should behave
fairly (or not). In sum, in addition to individuals’ moral models and religious beliefs, within-
sample ubiquity of: (a) (dis)honesty in moral models, as well as (b) beliefs about moralistic gods’
omniscience and (c) punishment, should predict fair play above and beyond the content of an.
To test whether moral models affect game play, we coded whether or not participants listed
honesty or dishonesty in their free-lists and used the summation of these two indices as a predictor
with possible values of 0, 1, and 2. As such, participants who did not answer free-list tasks or
answered with “I don’t know” are not considered in this analysis. Note that the odds of mention-
ing both honesty and dishonesty are related; a logistic regression shows that the odds of listing
dishonesty increase by 7.10 [95% CI = 4.48, 11.25] when participants list honesty.
5.1.3. Participants
Table 6 reports the summary statistics for experimental participants who listed “honesty” in
the “good” list (n = 104, 51 women, mean age = 37.26) or “dishonesty” in the bad list (n = 130,
49 women, mean age = 39.32). Note the considerable variability in the number of participants who
listed honesty or dishonesty across these eight populations. Ten individuals listed multiple items
coded as “honest” for the “good” list and 9 individuals listed two items coded as “dishonest” for
the “bad” list. Again, these individuals are treated as listing each only once.
Honesty in Good List Dishonesty in Bad List
Site N n Prop. M(SD) n Prop. M(SD)
Coastal Tanna 44 7 0.16 0.75 (0.20) 6 0.14 0.69 (0.22)
Hadza 68 8 0.12 0.52 (0.29) 10 0.15 0.59 (0.29)
Inland Tanna 76 1 0.01 0.25* (—) 2 0.03 0.71 (0.06)
Lovu, Fiji 76 40 0.53 0.73 (0.31) 41 0.54 0.65 (0.26)
Mauritius 91 4 0.04 0.57 (0.34) 4 0.04 0.55 (0.34)
Marajó 77 16 0.21 0.65 (0.31) 11 0.14 0.51 (0.35)
Tyva Republic 79 24 0.30 0.83 (0.20) 38 0.48 0.74 (0.28)
Yasawa, Fiji 72 4 0.06 0.40 (0.16) 18 0.25 0.72 (0.26)
Total 583 104 0.18 0.70 (0.29) 130 0.22 0.67 (0.28)
Table 6: Summary statistics for individuals per site who participated in the experiment and listed
“honest” and “dishonest” in the good and bad list respectively. N denotes number in sub-sample, n
denotes those who listed “honest” and “dishonest,” and Prop. refers to proportion of sub-sample listing these items.
Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) are of item salience. *Note that this value reflects the salience score of the
single individual.
5.1.4. Model
Again, elsewhere (Purzycki et al., 2016a,b), we found that individuals’ beliefs about morally
concerned deities’ punishment and knowledge breadth contributed to fairer play in a wide variety of
model specifications. We also found that the more children people had, the more likely they were to
allocate more coins to themselves and local communities. As some participants in the present study
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played in a treatment condition using various religious primes (with no overall effects detected),
we hold this and game order (Local Community Game first = 1) constant in the regressions (see
supplements for further details). In order to hold constant any effects for recognizing what the game
was about, we created an indicator variable where values of 1 denote when participants thought
the experiment was about fairness, honesty, and/or cheating (n = 31; 5% of the sample).
Here, we build upon the “Reduced models” in (Purzycki et al., in press). These reduced mod-
els were the result of backward-selected full models, had the lowest variance inflation factors, and
largest sample sizes of any other model specification. We develop these models and their application
in a few important ways. First, we incorporate moral models and culture as predictor variables at
individual and group levels, respectively. Here, the group level refers to within-sample ubiquity.
Second, we take group-level variation into account using varying effects. Rather than hold inter-
cultural variation constant, we incorporate it into our modeling structure (Gelman, 2006; Nezlek,
2010; Pinheiro and Bates, 2000). Third, we formally develop statistical models (see supplements)
in a Bayesian framework. Fourth, using prior defined distributions, we impute our missing data.
Our outcome variable is the binomially distributed count of allocating coins to the socially
distant cup. As mentioned above, this offers the strongest test of fairer play as the chances of
allocating a coin to geographically distant people better approximates to playing fairly than do
allocations to self- or local community (Hruschka et al., 2014; Purzycki et al., 2016b). The log-odds
of each allocation is defined as a linear combination of:
1. Varying intercepts for individual and group
2. Varying slopes by group for individual-level responses to moral models, moralistic gods’ pun-
ishment, and moralistic gods’ knowledge breadth
3. Fixed slopes by group for group-level average responses to moral models, moralistic gods’
punishment, and moralistic gods’ knowledge breadth
4. Simple effects for religious prime condition, order, game understanding check, game type, and
number of children
The group-level responses are given their own statistical models, as they are not observed but
rather must be inferred from the individual responses at each site. Rather than use simple fixed
indices of group-level variation (e.g., the mean value for the cultural variables in each site), we
infer them from the sample of individual statements. Then we simultaneously use the posterior
distribution of each in the model. This retains all uncertainty so that we do not limit ourselves to
point estimates that may lead to misleadingly false precision where there is actually a distribution
of values within communities. For each set of beliefs—moral models, moralistic gods’ punishment
and knowledge breadth—we simultaneously estimate a varying intercept representing the average
of each site’s individual responses and use this intercept, with all associated uncertainty, as a
predictor in the main model. This is analogous to a measurement error model, in which the
group-level predictors are measured with error. In principle, then, our model is four simultaneous
regressions: a main binomial regression predicting coin assignments and three varying intercept
regressions predicting individual responses by field site. Formal details of the model are included
in the supplementary materials.
With one exception, each individual played both games. We therefore restructured the data set
to include two duplicate participant-by-variable matrices and included a binary variable denoting
which game it represents (“Self Game” = 1). We included all values for coins to distant co-
religionists in a single vector and the cups designated for the local co-ethnic and participants in
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another single vector. The Hadza were not asked the game understanding check question, so we
marginalized over these and imputed other missing values (see script for details, and Supplements
for alternate imputation strategies).
We fit this model using the R package rethinking (version 1.71) (McElreath, 2016, 2017) and
rstan version 2.17.3 (Stan Development Team, 2017). We assessed chain convergence by inspecting
traceplots, R̂ values, and the number of effective samples, and encountered no problems in sampling.
The supplementary materials include further analyses in a frequentist statistical framework and
analyses of item salience.
5.2. Results
5.2.1. Individual-Level Effects
Table 7 reports the main models. Values are exponentiated mean estimates (OR) and 95%
credibility intervals (CI). We have highlighted the individual-level effects in Figure 2. As indicated
by the intercept, individuals predictably bias allocations in favor of themselves and their local
community across the eight sampled populations. As suggested by the Game variable, people favor
themselves slightly more than they favor their local communities (i.e., the odds and range of the
effect is trending toward values <1.00). Moreover, the effect of the number of children people have
is trending towards favoritism for the players themselves and their local communities.
OR [95% CI] OR [95% CI] OR [95% CI]
(Dis)honesty summation 1.03 [0.96, 1.12] — 1.03 [0.97, 1.09]
Moralistic gods’ punishment 1.09 [0.93, 1.29] 1.10 [0.95, 1.26] 1.10 [0.96, 1.25]
Moralistic gods’ knowledge 1.25 [1.03, 1.53] 1.25 [1.04, 1.51] 1.23 [1.02, 1.51]
Number of children 0.88 [0.70, 1.08] 0.86 [0.70, 1.06] 0.87 [0.70, 1.08]
Condition (treatment = 1) 0.97 [0.90, 1.05] 0.97 [0.89, 1.04] 0.96 [0.89, 1.04]
Local Game played first = 1 1.02 [0.96, 1.09] 1.02 [0.96, 1.09] 1.02 [0.95, 1.10]
Game about honesty? (yes = 1) 1.00 [0.85, 1.20] 1.02 [0.87, 1.22] 1.02 [0.86, 1.20]
Game (Self Game = 1) 0.97 [0.93, 1.02] 0.97 [0.93, 1.02] 0.97 [0.94, 1.01]
Group-level moral models 1.30 [0.51, 3.59] — —
Group-level gods’ punishment 1.65 [0.34, 6.25] 2.15 [0.59, 6.46] 2.23 [0.59, 6.55]
Group-level gods’ knowledge 1.10 [0.29, 4.13] 1.18 [0.36, 4.01] 1.13 [0.38, 3.41]
Table 7: Exponentiated mean estimates (OR) and 95% credibility intervals (CI) of chances of allocating
a coin to geographically distant co-religionists. The left-most model is the full model, the center model removes
all moral variables, and the right-most model includes only individual-level moral models.
Our focal individual-level variables—moral models, deities’ punishment and knowledge breadth—
all contribute to increasing the chances of allocating a coin to the geographically distant players.
Note here that the strongest effect is gods’ attributed knowledge breadth; the more individuals
claim gods know, the more likely they are to allocate to the distant cup. Gods’ punishment also
has an effect in the same direction, though not as obviously strong. Previous results (Purzycki
et al., 2016b) indicated that punishment predicted larger allocations than knowledge. However,
these previous models treated field site as a simple effect and did not allow any variables to have
differential effects across sites. Moreover, they considered only complete cases. Here, we allow these









Figure 2: Exponentiated 95% credibility intervals of mean estimates of individual-level effects of full
model from table 7. Horizontal axis is on a logarithmic scale. The dotted vertical line indicates the threshold of
no effect where variables with no reliable effects would have error symmetry around 1.0. Effects to the right of 1.0
predict greater odds of allocating a coin to geographically distant players whereas effects to the left indicate decreased
odds in such allocations.
The content of moral models influences game play; individuals who listed (dis)honesty are more
likely to play fairly (i.e., there is a 3% greater chance of allocating a coin to distant players). Note,
however, while the bulk of the probability mass is > 1, this effect is notably slight by comparison to
religious beliefs. As indicated by the relatively narrower intervals, it is, however, better estimated by
the model. In the supplements, among a variety of other model specifications, we show that salience
of (dis)honesty has a similar relationship to behavioral outcome; individuals who list (dis)honesty
earlier in lists are more likely to allocate coins to the distant players.
5.2.2. Group-Level Effects
Table 7 also includes the average contribution of moral and religious culture on allocations.
Figure 3 illustrates a projection of these group-level effects, assuming participants have no children
and answered all questions at the half-way mark (in this case 0.5). This includes the free-list
summations, which are inverse logit transformed to put them on the same scale as the other
cultural variables. Group-level beliefs in moralistic gods’ punishment (OR = 1.69, 95% CI = [0.39,
6.68]) exhibits the clearest positive trend (red in Figure 3). In other words, the ubiquity of beliefs
that gods punish in an individual’s community positively predicts his or her fair behavior in the
game (albeit with a range of error). Cultural ubiquity of (dis)honesty in moral models (green in
Figure 3) and gods’ knowledge breadth (blue in Figure 3) show no reliable effect on allocations
(i.e., their credibility intervals are more symmetrical around 1.00).
The strongest conclusion to be drawn from the main results is that—as indicated by the wide
intervals—these are poorly estimated factors. While the odds ratios (exponentiated mean estimates)
appear to be high, the 95% credibility interval width is quite broad and it is difficult to conclude
that culture–the prevalence of certain kinds of information within a community–has a systematic
effect on individual behavior cross-culturally. Using more liberal-but-standard analyses, however,
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we cautiously show that for populations where (dis)honesty is infrequently listed, models predict
that increasing its cultural prevalence brings allocations to distant players in this sites to baseline,
cross-site allocation levels (Supplements section 4.2.2, Figure S1). While individually held cultural
information predicts individual outcomes, it remains less clear as to how cultural prevalence of that
information does.




















































































Figure 3: Projected effects of cultural prevalence of (dis)honesty (green), gods’ punishment (red), and
gods’ knowledge (blue) on probability of allocating a coin to distant players. Results are from full model in
Table 7. Shading is 95% percentile intervals. Reference line is at the 50% mark indicating fair play. Across projections,
number of children are held at zero, and all other values are held at 0.5 (the halfway point for each variable, including
the inverse logit transformed values for moral models), varying only the group level values between 0 and 1.
6. Discussion
The studies presented here give new insight into the relationship between morality and the
kind of broad cooperation unique to humans. Among our diverse samples, the most salient and
ubiquitous components of moral culture revolve around reciprocity, cooperation, honesty, and dis-
honesty. This cross-cultural ethnographic data empirically confirm that moral culture is more
associated with the costs and benefits of social life (Alexander, 1987; Fessler et al., 2015; Greene,
2013; Tomasello and Vaish, 2013; Trivers, 1971) than with concerns of “justice” and “rights” (Turiel,
1983, 2006). We also found that individuals’ moral models predict honest behavior towards geo-
graphically distant individuals, but their effects were not as strong as the effects of religious beliefs.
As participants exhibited this behavior towards individuals they would never likely meet, our re-
sults also confirm the important role that individuals’ beliefs and values have on human sociality
by restraining selfish behavior. Group-level moral and religious culture, however, are not clearly
associated with individuals’ moral behavior. Below, we discuss various facets of the moral system
in light of these results.
6.1. Morality in mind
While we found an individual-level effect of moral models on honest, rule-following behavior,
the effect itself was quite small. This may have been due to the kind of data our methods elicit;
open-ended questions require categorization for analysis, which may have introduced bias. However,
field researchers collected and translated our ethnographic data which was checked multiple times
for quality and consistency across research assistants. Moreover, our models exhibited considerable
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precision in estimating (dis)honesty’s effect on behavior. We also considered other notions beyond
(dis)honesty that we might assume to be task-relevant. However, moral model components such
as “cheating,” “disobedience,” or “fairness” were either concentrated in a few communities or
rarely listed at all, thus making it difficult to reliably assess their effect on behavior in a global
cross-cultural study such as ours. Using the data presented here to design scales for measuring
individuals’ moral models would strike a balance between universal applicability and local relevance
(e.g., Boehm, 1979, 1980; Buchtel et al., 2015).
Moral models might be only as effective to the extent that an individual can implement them.
Accordingly, measuring other critical individual-level factors (e.g., self-control; Blasi 1980) to pre-
dict moral behavior might be also appropriate. One indication of this in the present study is the
cognitive salience of (dis)honesty. In the supplements, we show that the effects for individual-level
salience of (dis)honesty are similar to those we find above; the earlier individuals list (dis)honesty,
the greater the odds of allocating a coin to the distant participant (see supplements). In addition
to accessibility, item salience may indicate how readily individuals can implement these values.
This is consistent with the psychological literature that emphasizes the impact of quick moral intu-
itions over slow moral judgments (Baumard, 2016; Cone and Rand, 2014; Haidt, 2001; Lotz, 2015),
suggesting that deeper motivational forces are at work.
Fair play had a stronger association with religious beliefs than with moral models. The effect
of being watched and potentially punished by a transcendent being may have played a larger
role in our expanded sociality than moral cultivation. It also raises questions as to whether or
not human moralistic punishment is powerful enough to offset the costs of defecting on social
expectations (cf. Dawkins, 2016; De Waal, 2013; Johnson, 2016). In other words, not only moral
models but additional institutional and environmental factors are likely required to stabilize wider,
more predictable cooperation. The secularization literature (e.g., Norris and Inglehart, 2012) and
some of the aforementioned experimental work (e.g., Cronk, 2007; Gerkey, 2013) suggest that this
is the case.
6.2. Moral behavior
Some argue that the evolutionary function of moral behavior is to maintain individuals’ rep-
utations in reciprocal interactions (Baumard, 2016; Baumard et al., 2013; Sperber and Baumard,
2012). Our result that gods’ knowledge has the strongest and most reliable association with giving
more coins to distant players is consistent with this view insofar as one’s reputation matters in
the eyes of a god. Beliefs about morally concerned deities that know about and punish people for
immoral behavior might predict moral behavior more reliably because they harness–among other
things–psychological systems responsible for reputation management and punishment avoidance
(Johnson, 2016; Purzycki et al., 2016b). If concern of one’s reputation in his or her community
was strong enough to overcome both the anonymity afforded by these experiments and that target
recipients were in no position to reciprocate, we should have seen a relationship between moral cul-
ture and honest allocations. That is, individuals should have been more likely to play honestly if it
meant breaching widely held values (Baumard, 2016, p. 131, n. 13). We found no such association.
It may be, however, that moral culture functions in ways not captured by such games (see below).
Ongoing concerns revolve around the ecological validity of economic experiments (Baumard
and Sperber, 2010; Gervais, 2017; Gurven and Winking, 2008; Wiessner, 2009; Winking and Mizer,
2013). In small-scale societies, the anonymity afforded by these experiments is not always available.
Our study takes advantage of the rarely-offered anonymity by examining whether or not participants
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exploit the experimental context for their own gains. Moreover, recall that target recipients were
geographically distant individuals with whom participants are unlikely to interact; we assessed
whether or not cultural content can induce impartial and honest behavior in interactions we know
are not happening regularly in our study sites. Other options for assessing interactions are likely
to miss these rare encounters (Pisor and Gurven, 2016). As our religious belief measures showed a
relatively strong association with allocation, this suggests that we cannot easily dismiss the value
of using such games in toto.
6.3. Moral culture
Consistent with the precedent study examining cultural variation (Gurven et al., 2008), our
results are inconclusive as to whether or not moral culture actually corresponds to individual
behavior. As indicated by the wide credible intervals of our model estimates, group-level moral
or religious commitments within a community do not reliably predict individual behavior. It may
be the case that there are unmeasured, contextual factors that may be responsible for this model
uncertainty. For instance, we do not know the relationship between moral culture and the threat of
punishment for moral violations in each sample (Boyd and Richerson, 1992). We also do not have
a reliable sense of moral culture’s relationship with socioecological factors such as material security
(Hruschka et al., 2014) or environmental harshness (Gelfand et al., 2011). As our sample is limited
to eight field sites, more attention to group-level measures such as these in a larger sample would
facilitate a more reliable assessment of these factors’ relative contributions.
However, it may be the case that behaviors that correspond to moral virtues occur too context-
specifically or situationally to be reliably evoked in experimental games (Fessler et al., 2015; Gerkey,
2013; North, 1991). We do not have a precise grasp of the components of individuals’ moral models
that become salient when they operate in different contexts (or whether or not they do). At the
group level, rather than having a direct, measurable effect on our behavior, cultural ubiquity and
institutions may only facilitate learning the rules and norms for successfully navigating social life
(cf. Brodbeck et al., 2013; Cohn et al., 2014; Cronk, 2007; Lesorogol, 2007; Gerkey, 2013; Smaldino,
2014), thus making them more salient in situ. While our results suggest that the composition of
mental models predicts cooperative behavior that transcends what might otherwise be parochial
boundaries (e.g., Hruschka et al., 2014; Pisor and Gurven, 2016), examining when, and where, and
to whom participants claim these moral prescriptions apply would be a logical next step for future
inquiry (cf. Fessler et al., 2015).
6.4. Evolution of moral systems
Social systems have long been held to structure human interactions, but their mechanics are
rarely detailed with empirical data. We assessed some components of moral systems here by focusing
on individual models, local culture, and their contribution to honest behavior between members
of disparate communities. Like any social system, moral systems are the aggregate output of the
complex interactions between deeper cognitive adaptations and our socioecological environments
(Barrett, 2014; Kiper and Sosis, 2014). Further consideration of deeper psychological systems
(Cosmides and Tooby, 2005; Curry, 2016; Graham et al., 2011) and their relationship to culture
and institutions (Gerkey, 2013; Stagnaro et al., 2017) is necessary to further assess the dynamism
between moral systems and human cooperation.
As is true with all cross-sectional and correlational research, we cannot satisfactorily explain
variation or account for the causal links and feedback between facets of moral systems. The
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variability we see in moral culture may reflect variation in the challenges people collectively face
together, but whether or not it contributes to the resolution of those challenges remains an open
question (Alexander, 1987; Curry, 2016; Greene, 2013; Haidt and Kesebir, 2010). As is the case
for most traits, uncovering the genesis of moral systems is a difficult-if not impossible-task, but
longitudinal research on the topic would be better able to address the links between cognitive
adaptations, culture, and environment by tracking individual- and group-level moral models and
behavior, including how they change, from which sources they appear to develop, and the forces at
work in their selective retention.
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Lai, Peter Manǒ, and Ted Slingerland. We also thank the Department of Human Behavior, Ecology
and Culture at MPI for their feedback, particularly Bret Beheim for his help with the by-site plots
in the supplements. We also thank the reviewers and Dan Fessler for their critical feedback.
Author Contributions
B.G.P. conceived, initiated, and managed this project, wrote the bulk of the manuscript, supple-
ments, and R code, performed analysis and contributed to model development. A.P. contributed
to writing the manuscript, supplements, and R code. R.M. contributed to main model develop-
ment, its description, corollary R code, and group-level plots. C.A., Q.D.A., E.C., R.A.M., B.G.P.,
A.K.W., and D.X. collected data and contributed to protocol design with J.H. and A.N. All authors
provided feedback.
Supplementary Materials
Supplementary materials including data, R scripts, and methods protocols to this article can be
found online at https://github.com/bgpurzycki/Moral-Models-Moral-Behavior and at Purzy-
cki et al. (2017, 2016a).
Research Ethics
This project was initially approved by the University of British Columbia’s Behavioural Research
Ethics Board (#H13-00671) and subsequently approved by the ethical review boards at the home
university of each researcher who collected data.
Competing Interests
We declare that we have no competing interests.
19
References
Alexander, R. D., 1987. The Biology of Moral Systems. Aldine Transaction, New Brunswick.
Apicella, C. L., Marlowe, F. W., Fowler, J. H., Christakis, N. A., 2012. Social networks and
cooperation in hunter-gatherers. Nature 481 (7382), 497.
Ashton, M. C., Lee, K., de Vries, R. E., 2014. The hexaco honesty-humility, agreeableness, and
emotionality factors a review of research and theory. Personality and Social Psychology Review
18 (2), 139–152.
Barrett, H. C., 2014. The shape of thought: How mental adaptations evolve. Oxford University
Press.
Barrett, H. C., Bolyanatz, A., Crittenden, A. N., Fessler, D. M., Fitzpatrick, S., Gurven, M.,
Henrich, J., Kanovsky, M., Kushnick, G., Pisor, A., et al., 2016. Small-scale societies exhibit
fundamental variation in the role of intentions in moral judgment. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences 113 (17), 4688–4693.
Baumard, N., 2016. The origin of fairness. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
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2
1. Protocols, Data, and R Code
The methodological protocols, data sets, and R code are publicly available at: https://github.com/
bgpurzycki/Moral-Models-Moral-Behavior. The R code includes step-by-step instructions on how to
analyze and restructure the free-list data according to the appropriate analyses including: 1) calculations of
item salience for free-list data; 2) assessing universal and local models of good and bad; 3) extracting binary
values for listing “honesty” and “dishonesty”; 4) adding the salience and binary values to the main data
set; and 5) code for regressing these and other values on coin allocations for both main and supplementary
analyses.
2. Sample
Below, we briefly detail the populations with whom we conducted our work. Details for the present study
are in table S1. Further details of these sites and our sampling techniques can be found at [15, 18].
Site/Sample Moralistic Deity Distant Player Language of Study
Coastal Tanna Christian god from another Christian village Bislama
Hadza Haine another Hadza from another camp Hadzane/Swahili
Inland Tanna Kalpapen from another Kastom village Navhaal
Lovu, Fiji Shiva Hindu on Vanua Levu Fiji-Hindi/English
Mauritians Shiva Hindu from La Gaulette Mauritian Creole
Marajó, Brazil Christian god Christian from Rondon Portuguese
Tyva Republic Buddha-Burgan Buddhist from Ak Dovurak Tyvan
Yasawa, Fiji Christian god Fijian Christians from another island Bauan Fijian
Table S1: Further descriptive features of each field site.
2.1. Coastal and Inland Tanna, Vanuatu
The inhabitants of Tanna Island in Vanuatu are traditionally swidden horticulturalists although a market-
based economy plays an increasingly important role on the island [2, 4]. Religious beliefs are a mix of
Christianity and the traditional “Kastom” pantheon, as well as millenarian “cargo cults.” The study was
conducted at two sites on Tanna: a cluster of three inland, predominantly Kastom hamlets that rely almost
exclusively on subsistence farming for food production, and a wealthier coastal, Christian village in which
home production accounts for about two thirds of food consumption. For the Inland Tanna site, the “moral-
istic god” used for the survey questions was the Kastom creator god and culture hero, Kalpapen while the
Coastal site used the Christian god.
2.2. Hadza, Tanzania
Living in the savannah woodlands of western Tanzania, the Hadza are a population of hunter-gatherers
who largely subsist on wild game, fruits, tubers, and honey [1, 11]. While the Hadza have been described
as having a minimalist form of religion, this appears to be changing. Hadza camps exhibit fission-fusion
organization and camp membership is quite fluid, with individuals moving frequently between camps. Labor
is divided between the sexes; men hunt and extract honey while women typically focus on gathering plants.
2.3. Lovu, Fiji
On the south Pacific island of Vanua Levu, in main island in the Fijian archipelago, the Indo-Fijians
are a diaspora population brought to Fiji from India by the British as indentured workers [9, 22]. They
are primarily wage laborers or sugar cane farmers. The Indo-Fijians are mostly Hindus and Muslims with
a minority of Sikhs and Christians. The present sample consisted of Hindu Indo-Fijians from Lovu village
on the island of Viti Levu. The participants were all wage laborers or unemployed. Though there are many
gods in the Hindu tradition, the participants believed that all gods are aspects of one single God (Bhagwan).
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2.4. Marajó, Brazil
Pesqueiro is a small fishing village on the east side of Marajó Island at the mouth of the Amazon River
[6]. Subsistence is primarily market-based, relying on fish sales in the nearby town of Soure and a growing
tourism industry. The majority of inhabitants identify as Catholic, though there is a minority of Evangelical
Protestants.
2.5. Pointe aux Piments, Mauritius
Mauritius is a cluster of islands about 1,200 miles off the coast of southeastern Africa [5, 23]. Though
historically dependent largely on sugar exports, Mauritius has developed into a diversified, market-based,
monetized economy in recent decades. The main employment sectors include manufacturing, tourism, fi-
nancial services, information technology, fish processing, and construction. Rural areas continue to rely on
horticulture and fishing for subsistence. The study was conducted in the coastal rural village of Pointe
aux Piments, which lacks industrial development. The majority of the local population is of low or middle
income, employed mainly in fishing, agriculture, tourism, and other services. The village has a religiously
mixed population, with Christians and Hindus each making up approximately 45% of the total. Our sample
for this study consisted of Hindus.
2.6. Kyzyl, Tyva Republic (Russia)
Part of the Russian Federation, the Tyva Republic lies in southern Siberia, in the center of Asia [17, 21].
Urban Tyvans subsist primarily on a market-based economy while rural Tyvans rely significantly more on
produce provided by livestock (sheep, goats, cattle, yaks). The study was conducted in the capital city of
Kyzyl primarily among urban Tyvans, though some were farmers. While the majority of Tyvans identifies as
Buddhist, traditional religious practices associated with shamanism, animism, and totemism have a strong
presence as well.
2.7. Yasawa, Fiji
Yasawa Island lies at the northwestern corner of the Fijian archipelago [8, 12]. Yasawans subsist primarily
as fisher-horticulturalists. The present sample consists mainly of villagers living closest to the only resort
on Yasawa Island as of July 2013. As such, this village has had the highest population of residents with
the most extensive and frequent interaction with a resort. All Yasawans identify as Christian, with a
majority practicing as Wesleyan Methodists and a large minority practicing as Assemblies of God evangelicals.
Additionally, their Christian beliefs and practices coexist alongside beliefs about traditional deified ancestor
spirits that can bring illness, misfortune, and death to those who deviate from proper traditional Fijian
social norms, often at the behest of sorcerers.
3. Moral Models
3.1. Methods
For reasons expressed in the main article (e.g., difficulty with scale designs), the most straightforward
and universally applicable way to ask participants about moral models was asking them to freely list things
that they think are “good” and “bad.” Our protocols instructed field researchers to ask:
• Please list up to 5 behaviors that make someone a good/virtuous/moral person.
• Please list up to 5 behaviors that make a bad/immoral person.
Because of local variation and the lack of lexical equivalents to “moral” and “immoral,” we required some
flexibility in design. Per site English translations of the good/bad questions are as follows with language of
study in parentheses. Participants were asked to “Please list up to 5 behaviors that...”
• Hadza (Hadzane and Swahili): “...make someone with good/bad character or behavior.”
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• Coastal Tanna (Bislama): “...make someone good/not good.”
• Inland Tanna (Nivhaal): “...make someone good/bad.”
• Lovu, Fiji (Fiji Hindi and English): “...make a good, virtuous, moral person/bad, immoral per-
son.”
• Marajó, Brazil (Portuguese): “...make a good or virtuous person/bad or immoral person.”
• Mauritius (Mauritian Creole): “...a good, moral, and virtuous person/bad or immoral person
has.”
• Tyva Republic (Tyvan): “...make a good/bad person.”
• Yasawa, Fiji (Bauan Fijian): “...make a good/bad person.”
3.2. Codebook for free-list data
The data set (the CERC_Moral_Model_FL.csv file) contains 15 variables. To provide a variety of ways
to code the data and as a quality check, Purzycki and two research assistants (NC and TL henceforth)
independently cleaned and coded the data. We strove to ensure that items with subtle lexical differences
were the same (e.g., “thievery” and “theft” would be recoded as “theft”). Purzycki encouraged assistants
to cluster items conservatively and to keep their own codes consistent across sites. One small chunk of this
data set was coded in error and some individuals’ data were recovered after the initial coding regime (see
data set and codebook). We therefore use Purzycki’s recoded data in the present analyses.
• Culture: Name of field site
• CERCID: ID number of participant
• Order: Order in which item was listed (1 = first listed)
• GOOD_ORIG_NC: Original in-English translated data for “good” data used by coder NC
• GOOD_ORIG_TL: Original in-English translated data for “good” data used by coder TL
• MATCH_GOOD: Match check of original items in “good” list. “Corrected” indicates where Purzycki found
inconsistencies due to a sorting error, and subsequently corrected them. “Match” indicates consistency
across coders. “NewCode” indicates data that were recovered after initial coding by NC and TL.
• GOOD_SPEC_NC: Specific coding scheme for “good” list by coder NC (unless MATCH_GOOD is coded as
“NewCode,” see below)
• GOOD_SPEC_TL: Specific coding scheme for “good” list by coder TL
• GOOD_SPEC_BP: Specific coding scheme for “good” list by Purzycki (used in present analyses)
• BAD_ORIG_NC: Original in-English translated data for “bad” data used by coder NC (unless MATCH_BAD
is coded as “NewCode,” see below)
• BAD_ORIG_TL: Original in-English translated data for “bad” data used by coder TL
• MATCH_BAD: Match check of original items in “bad” list. “Corrected” indicates where Purzycki found
inconsistencies due to a sorting error, and subsequently corrected them. “Match” indicates consistency
across coders. “NewCode” indicates data that were recovered after initial coding by NC and TL.
• BAD_SPEC_NC: Specific coding scheme for “bad” list by coder NC
• BAD_SPEC_TL: Specific coding scheme for “bad” list by coder TL
• BAD_SPEC_BP: Specific coding scheme for “bad” list by Purzycki (used in present analyses)
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3.3. Results
Tables S2 and S3 detail item types listed cross-culturally for the “good” and “bad” lists respectively (see
Tables 3 and 4 in the main text for truncated versions). In these tables, we report only those items where
Smith’s S ≥ 0.10 for the sake of viewing ease. The R script includes code to view and reproduce full tables
with all items where Smith’s S is <0.10. Smith’s S scores were calculated using the following sample sizes
(good/bad lists): (1) Coastal Tanna-44/44; (2) Hadza-69/69; (3) Inland Tanna-74/78; (4) Lovu Fiji-79/79;
(5) Mauritius-82/84; (6) Marajó-77/76; (7) Tyva Republic-115/117; (8) Yasawa Fiji-103/103.
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Table S2: Cross-cultural models for what makes a “good” per-
son. Mean (M) and sum (S) of salience scores. Only Smith’s S ≥ 0.10
are reported. Recall that the denominator for M Salience is the number
of Items listed, whereas the denominator in Smith’s S is sample size.
*Indicative of responses that include “good people” or “character” in
their response.
Culture Item M Salience S Salience Smith’s S
Coastal Tanna Generous/Shares 0.74 17.67 0.40
Coastal Tanna Respectful 0.61 13.35 0.30
Coastal Tanna Helpful 0.71 12.00 0.27
Coastal Tanna Loving 0.65 9.82 0.22
Coastal Tanna Kind 0.77 6.93 0.16
Coastal Tanna Obedient 0.56 6.75 0.15
Coastal Tanna Hospitable 0.49 5.35 0.12
Coastal Tanna Honest 0.75 5.25 0.12
Coastal Tanna No Stealing 0.58 5.20 0.12
Hadza Good* 0.84 32.60 0.47
Hadza Loving 0.62 27.48 0.40
Hadza Generous/Shares 0.56 23.32 0.34
Hadza Peaceful 0.60 13.27 0.19
Hadza Hospitable 0.64 10.25 0.15
Hadza Intelligent 0.65 7.83 0.11
Hadza Respectful 0.58 7.53 0.11
Inland Tanna Hospitable 0.74 33.08 0.45
Inland Tanna Generous/Shares 0.69 31.97 0.43
Inland Tanna Kind 0.87 26.17 0.35
Inland Tanna Respectful 0.49 23.98 0.32
Inland Tanna No Stealing 0.66 18.52 0.25
Inland Tanna Obedient 0.52 14.63 0.20
Inland Tanna Loving 0.81 10.47 0.14
Inland Tanna Helpful 0.41 9.38 0.13
Inland Tanna No Swearing 0.49 8.88 0.12
Lovu Fiji Honest 0.73 30.02 0.38
Lovu Fiji Helpful 0.58 16.88 0.21
Lovu Fiji Good* 0.74 15.58 0.20
Lovu Fiji Religious Faith 0.78 10.85 0.14
Lovu Fiji Speaking Well 0.81 8.07 0.10
Mauritius Speaking Well 0.84 26.87 0.33
Mauritius Helpful 0.62 24.00 0.29
Mauritius Good* 0.71 15.70 0.19
Mauritius Generous/Shares 0.72 15.12 0.18
Mauritius Manners 0.73 10.90 0.13
Mauritius Hard-working 0.65 9.80 0.12
Mauritius Respectful 0.60 8.45 0.10
Pesqueiro Helpful 0.70 14.07 0.18
Pesqueiro Caring 0.68 13.65 0.18
Pesqueiro Generous/Shares 0.65 11.03 0.14
Pesqueiro Honest 0.65 10.47 0.14
Pesqueiro Happy 0.69 9.63 0.13
Pesqueiro Manners 0.77 9.20 0.12
Pesqueiro Good* 0.68 8.87 0.12
Pesqueiro Friendly 0.47 8.43 0.11
Pesqueiro Humble 0.58 8.15 0.11
Tyva Republic Good* 0.72 43.42 0.38
Continued on next page
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Table S2 – “Good” models continued from previous page
Culture Item M Salience S Salience Smith’s S
Tyva Republic Honest 0.74 31.95 0.28
Tyva Republic Helpful 0.61 26.25 0.23
Tyva Republic Hard-working 0.58 24.90 0.22
Tyva Republic Respectful 0.63 15.22 0.13
Tyva Republic Kind 0.64 12.80 0.11
Tyva Republic Intelligent 0.53 11.60 0.10
Tyva Republic Humane 0.66 11.20 0.10
Yasawa Fiji Church 0.68 40.10 0.39
Yasawa Fiji Attitude 0.80 25.60 0.25
Yasawa Fiji Obedient 0.64 21.60 0.21
Yasawa Fiji Merciful 0.64 20.60 0.20
Yasawa Fiji Good* 0.64 20.40 0.20
Yasawa Fiji Listens 0.81 18.60 0.18
Yasawa Fiji Hard-working 0.53 18.40 0.18
Yasawa Fiji Generous/Shares 0.54 10.20 0.10
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Table S3: Cross-cultural models for what makes a “bad” person.
Mean (M) and sum (S) of salience scores. Only Smith’s S ≥ 0.10 are
reported. Recall that the denominator for M Salience is the number
of Items listed, whereas the denominator in Smith’s S is sample size.
*Indicative of responses that include “bad people” or “character” in
their response.
Culture Item M Salience S Salience Smith’s S
Coastal Tanna Theft 0.76 20.40 0.46
Coastal Tanna Disrespectful 0.64 14.15 0.32
Coastal Tanna Violent 0.66 12.57 0.29
Coastal Tanna Disobedient 0.64 8.27 0.19
Coastal Tanna Selfish 0.74 6.70 0.15
Coastal Tanna Bad Language (Swearing) 0.47 5.70 0.13
Coastal Tanna Drugs/Alcohol/Substance 0.69 4.80 0.11
Hadza Murder 0.52 23.60 0.34
Hadza Greedy 0.77 22.45 0.33
Hadza Theft 0.60 21.63 0.31
Hadza Violent 0.65 21.35 0.31
Hadza Bad* 0.81 17.87 0.26
Hadza Angry 0.66 6.63 0.10
Hadza Troublemaker 0.82 6.60 0.10
Inland Tanna Theft 0.76 28.72 0.37
Inland Tanna Inhospitable 0.78 22.72 0.29
Inland Tanna Disrespectful 0.47 21.20 0.27
Inland Tanna Bad Language (Swearing) 0.63 18.25 0.23
Inland Tanna Disobedient 0.59 15.88 0.20
Inland Tanna Unkind 0.75 13.58 0.17
Inland Tanna Violent 0.73 12.35 0.16
Inland Tanna Not Feeding Others 0.64 8.35 0.11
Inland Tanna Unhelpful 0.47 7.58 0.10
Lovu Fiji Theft 0.82 28.73 0.36
Lovu Fiji Dishonest 0.64 26.97 0.34
Lovu Fiji Jealous 0.68 16.42 0.21
Lovu Fiji Violent 0.70 14.03 0.18
Lovu Fiji Drugs/Alcohol/Substance 0.81 8.92 0.11
Lovu Fiji Betrayal/Backbiting 0.62 8.70 0.11
Lovu Fiji Bad Company/Peers 0.84 8.42 0.11
Mauritius Violent 0.65 25.28 0.30
Mauritius Drugs/Alcohol/Substance 0.70 25.07 0.30
Mauritius Theft 0.62 14.90 0.18
Mauritius Doesn’t Speak Well 0.70 13.98 0.17
Mauritius Disrespectful 0.65 10.98 0.13
Mauritius Selfish 0.64 10.85 0.13
Mauritius Bad* 0.60 9.53 0.11
Pesqueiro Ignorance/Stupidity/Uncultured 0.69 10.30 0.14
Pesqueiro Bad* 0.77 10.03 0.13
Pesqueiro Selfish 0.55 9.93 0.13
Pesqueiro Envious 0.74 8.85 0.12
Pesqueiro Unhelpful 0.85 8.47 0.11
Tyva Republic Dishonest 0.70 41.25 0.35
Tyva Republic Bad* 0.75 20.90 0.18
Tyva Republic Drugs/Alcohol/Substance 0.63 19.02 0.16
Tyva Republic Cruel 0.56 15.65 0.13
Tyva Republic Envious 0.71 15.55 0.13
Continued on next page
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Table S3 – “Bad” models continued from previous page
Culture Item M Salience S Salience Smith’s S
Tyva Republic Lazy 0.60 15.50 0.13
Tyva Republic Theft 0.57 15.40 0.13
Yasawa Fiji Theft 0.80 33.80 0.33
Yasawa Fiji Disobedient 0.64 22.95 0.22
Yasawa Fiji No Church 0.53 18.60 0.18
Yasawa Fiji Dishonest 0.69 15.13 0.15
Yasawa Fiji Doesn’t Listen 0.64 14.07 0.14
Yasawa Fiji Bad Language (Swearing) 0.67 12.80 0.12
Yasawa Fiji Proud 0.66 11.25 0.11
Yasawa Fiji Lazy 0.61 11.00 0.11
Yasawa Fiji Drugs/Alcohol/Substance 0.79 11.00 0.11
Yasawa Fiji Greedy 0.62 10.00 0.10
3.4. Notes on the experiment’s effects on free-lists
The fact that we interviewed participants after they played games may raise suspicions that the experiments
somehow influenced the content of moral models. There are a few reasons why participants were probably not more
inclined to say “honest” and “dishonest” after playing a game measuring (dis)honest behavior. First, participants
answered demographic questions before answering the free-list questions. This process took about 10-15 minutes.
Second, the game check variable we hold constant should account for–at the very least–explicit recognition of the
game’s purpose. A logistic regression without considering the game check variable shows that the probability of
listing “honesty” is 18% (logistic transform of -1.52). The mean estimate for the game check question was 0.62.
Logistic transforming this summation yields a 29% probability of listing “honesty.” Adding the mean estimate for
the game check question (0.62) therefore suggests an increase of 11% (29% - 18% = 11%). Note, however, that only 9
individuals who listed “honesty” recognized that the game was about it (397 did not list honesty and did not indicate
they understood what the game was measuring, and 22 recognized the purpose of the game, but did not list honesty).
Third–as per Table 5 in the main text–there are a few sites where few individuals listed (dis)honesty, suggesting that
if the game was priming the free-listing of (dis)honesty, it was not occurring systematically. Fourth, previous research
[19] assessing what it means to be good shows that across seven societies, “honest” is highly salient in most contexts.
Fifth, a previous case study [13] using a similar free-list method with a different sample who didn’t play the game
(in the Tyva Republic) suggests there is some consistency in content across these studies. There, items were coded
independently of the present project, and participants were encouraged to list 10-15 items of what makes specifically a
good or bad Tyvan person, rather than the capped-at-5 general description of (im)moral people as was the case here.
Moreover, for the present study, to ensure that recipients and players were of the same religion, Purzycki recruited
participants who self-identified as Buddhist. In the previous study, recruitment was open to any ethnic Tyvan. In
the previous study, the eight-most salient items for what it means to be a “good Tyvan” were: hard-working (S =
0.40), helpful (0.30), kind (0.29), modest (0.28), respectful (0.26), honest (0.22), intelligent (0.22) and having love
for family (0.19). “Bad Tyvans” were: untrustworthy (S = 0.66), alcohol abusers (0.53), lazy (0.34), envious (0.20),
greedy (0.19), disrespectful (0.18), cruel (0.17), and ignorant (0.14). In terms of content, both are quite similar to
the present results (see Table S2). In the present Tyvan sample, “honest” had a Smith’s S of 0.28 (vs. 0.22 in the
previous study), a negligible difference. However, “dishonest” had an S of 0.35 (vs. 0.66 for “untrustworthy”), much
lower than the previous study. This would suggest that at least in the case of Tyvans, the game could potentially
reduce the salience of items, at least in the “bad” subdomain. However, “honesty” (after ignoring “good” in the
good free-list task) and “dishonesty” were the most salient items listed for the present sample. In summary, despite
methodological, coding, and sampling differences, even if the game reduced the salience of dishonesty for Tyvans,
these items still had the highest salience across both studies.
4. Moral Behavior
4.1. Methods
A summary [15] of our focal data set provides all variable definitions, sampling strategies, and code for analyzing
experimental data in a variety of ways. Data sets and images of experimental conditions are also available online
[14] and at https://github.com/bgpurzycki/Moral-Models-Moral-Behavior. The following variables represent a
distillation of models published elsewhere [16, 18]:
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1. Moralistic gods’ punishment was the composite mean value of two questions with binary response values
(no = 0; yes = 1): Does [DEITY NAME] ever punish people for their behavior? and Can [DEITY NAME]
influence what happens to people after they die?
2. Moralistic gods’ knowledge was the mean value of two binary-response questions (no = 0; yes = 1) about
the breadth of deities’ knowledge: Can [DEITY NAME] see into peoples hearts or know their thoughts and
feelings? and Can [DEITY NAME] see what people are doing if they are far away in [a distant town or city
familiar to locals]?
3. Number of children was self-reported number of children “fathered or given birth to.”
4. Treatment condition is an indicator variable denoting whether (= 1) or not (= 0) participants played games
in the presence of an image or object with local religious significance. This was a manipulation in which these
objects were selected on the basis of having no visual indices of agency (i.e., no eyes).
5. Game order is an indicator variable tracking which game participants played first. This is denoted with a
“1” if participants played the Local Community Game first and a “0” if they played the Self Game first.
6. Game was about honesty? denotes whether responses to post-experimental questions asking participants
what they thought the games were about included “honesty,” “fairness,” and/or “cheating.”
Recall from the main text that some sites had religious prime conditions. These sites were: Lovu (Fiji), Mauritius,
Marajó, Tyva Republic, and Yasawa. Lovu Fijians in the treatment condition played games on a table with a
statue that abstractly represented Shiva (a lingam). Mauritians in the treatment condition played in a Hindu
temple. Brazilian participants played near a Bible and crucifix necklace, the Tyvan condition included playing near
a Buddhist luck charm (kamgalal), and Yasawans in the treatment condition played on a cloth with a cross, Bible,
and Bible verse (Mark 9:23) printed on it. Further descriptions and images of prime conditions can be found at:
https://github.com/bgpurzycki/Evolution-of-Religion-and-Morality. Again, we found no overall relationship
between playing in treatment conditions and game outcome. We nevertheless hold this factor constant in our models.
Note that the Hadza were not asked what they thought the game was about. In the main models, we imputed this
and all other missing data from prior distributions (see Supplementary section 3.2.3. for distributions and R script
for implementation). For the frequentist models, we used a couple of different imputation techniques (see below).
4.2. Main model specifications
The statistical analysis is essentially a binomial regression with varying effects used to manage repeat observations
on individuals and groups. The additional feature of the model is that we use group-level predictors to express average
norms and beliefs in each group. However, these predictors are not directly observable and must be estimated
themselves. Therefore, simultaneous models are run to: (1) estimate those predictors, and (2) plug the resulting
variable distributions directly into the individual-level regression. This method retains all uncertainty arising from
sample size and variance in each group. Below, we explain the full model in pieces.
4.2.1. Coin model
To model the coin allocations y out of 30, we use a binomial regression:
yi ∼ Binomial(30, pi) (1)
logit(pi) = α+ σidzid[i] + agroup[i] (2)
+ bhgroup[i]hi + b
HHgroup[i] (3)
+ bpgroup[i]pi + b
PPgroup[i] (4)
+ bogroup[i]oi + b
OOgroup[i] (5)





The linear predictor logit(pi) measures partial associations between the amount allocated to the distant cup and
both group and individual variables. Line (2) includes an intercept α for the full sample and varying intercepts for
individual and group1. The next three lines express the three cultural variables of interest, at both individual and
1Efficient sampling is made possible by the use of the non-centered prior for the individual varying effects, the σidzid[i]
construction in the coin model where zid represents the varying effect by individual; zid ∼ Normal(0, 1), σid ∼ Exponential(1).
We attempted the model first with a traditional centered parameterization, where the scale parameter σid was in the prior for
zid, but that made analyses fail. We therefore put it directly in the linear model.
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group levels: honesty (h/H), gods’ punishment (p/P) and knowledge breadth (i.e., omniscience) (o/O). Individual
responses are given lowercase letters whereas group averages are given capital letters. Each group has its own
varying slope for individual variables, allowing the relationship between individual response (e.g., whether they listed
(dis)honesty) and behavior to vary across groups. The last line, (6), contains simple (i.e., fixed) effects for number
of children, the experimental treatment condition, game order, game check, and an indicator for game (Self Game =
1), respectively.
All simple effects above are assigned weakly-regularizing Normal(0, 1) priors. These guard against finding strong
effects in small samples or those that vary considerably in responses, but are easily overwhelmed in large or consistent
samples.
The varying intercepts for individuals are given a prior scale of:
σid ∼ Exponential(1)















where S is a diagonal matrix of standard deviations of the intercept and the three cultural variables of interest:
S =

σa 0 0 0
0 σbh 0 0
0 0 σbp 0
0 0 0 σbo

and R is a full rank correlation matrix of the same variables. Each standard deviation is assigned an independent
Exponential(1) prior as before, and R is given a weakly regularizing prior from the LKJ family [10] as implemented
by RStan 2.14.1 [20]:
R ∼ LKJCorr(4)
This is necessary because, unlike the four standard deviations, the six individual correlations inside R cannot be
independent of one another. The constraint that the correlation matrices be positive definite severely constrains
possible combinations of the six parameters. The LKJCorr family manages this by composing symmetric Beta
distribution shapes, that is, symmetric distributions of potential correlations. As the dimension of such a matrix and
the shape parameter η grow, the prior is increasingly concentrated on the identity matrix (i.e., all numbers on the
diagonal are 1 and all other values are 0). The value we use here, η = 4, regularizes by penalizing extreme correlations
(e.g., 1 or -1). Sometimes strong regularization is needed to fit such a model, but we found the model sampled just
fine even with no regularization imposed on this matrix. We retain the regularization because it is best practice.
4.2.2. Group belief models
Three of the predictor variables above are unobserved: Hgroup, Pgroup, and Ogroup. These are average honesty,
punishment, and omniscience beliefs for each group. Since these cannot be observed, we infer them from the sample
of individual statements in that group. We simultaneously fit these three models and the coin model above using the
posterior distribution of each in the coin model. This retains all uncertainty so that we do not impart false precision
to the estimates.
In each of the three cases, we treat the unobserved variables as varying intercepts for each group. For example,
the honesty model is:
hi ∼ Binomial(2, pi)
logit(pi) = Hgroup[i]
Hj ∼ Normal(µH , σH)
µH ∼ Normal(0, 5)
σH ∼ Exponential(1)
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The observed hi values take the values 0, 1, or 2, where the values represent neither, one, or both honesty and
dishonesty were listed. The above is therefore a binomial GLMM with two trials. The latent estimate Hgroup is
our target of inference, and Hj defines the priors for each group. The models for Pgroup and Ogroup are constructed
analogously.
4.2.3. Imputation models
For the main model, we relied on the following distributions for the imputation of missing data:
children ∼ Normal(µchildren, σchildren)




φcheck ∼ Beta(1, 1)
σpunishment ∼ Exponential(1)
σomniscience ∼ Exponential(1)
4.2.4. Sampling and diagnostics
We took 500 samples from each of the 4 chains with a target acceptance rate of 0.99 and all other settings the
default as of RStan 2.14.1. Sampling was very efficient. All R̂ values were below 1.01 and effective sample sizes were
greater than 50% of the actual sample count.
5. Supplementary Analyses
In addition to the primary Bayesian models in the main text and above, we also ran a variety of model specifications
using standard multi-level binomial logistic regressions for the sake of comparison and robustness checking. All models
were fit using the lme4 package [3] for use in R.
Note again that the Hadza were not asked what they thought the game was about (the “game check” variable
discussed above). In these models, we imputed these missing values in two ways. One method relied on an imputation
function that randomly selects data points from the rest of the sample [7, p. 534]. These results are reported here. We
also used a dummy value for the missing Hadza game check data and also ran the same models without the Hadza,
and the qualitative results hold (results are not reported here, but procedures are included in the R script). In
general the individual-level results are qualitatively the same as the main model, but we do highlight some important
modeling differences throughout the discussion.
Table S4 reports full models, all of which vary gods’ punishment and knowledge breadth across sites. They
also vary moral model values (i.e., summation of (dis)honesty, and the salience of honesty and dishonesty). Table
S5 reports results from models that tease apart the specific components of the free-list data and assesses the role
that, for instance, listing honesty or dishonesty individually play. As participants played two games, all models have
varying intercepts for individuals.
5.1. Varying cultural variables across sites
Table S4 reports five model specifications. The first is a reduced model that only includes moralistic deities’
knowledge and punishment as varied effects across sites. The second model (model mS4.full in the R script) includes
varying effects for the three cultural variables—summation of (dis)honesty, moralistic gods’ punishment and knowledge
breadth—across sites; each site has its own intercept and each effect has its own slope. The next model (model
mS4.1) varies all of the cultural variables independently by site, where site has only a single intercept associated
with (dis)honesty. The next two models are the same, but instead of the summations of (dis)honesty, we consider
cognitive salience.
Does cognitive salience or accessibility of (dis)honesty predict honest play? We would expect that the degree to
which individuals can access task-relevant components to moral models will also play a role in motivating individuals
to behave in accordance with their moral prescriptions. In order to test this, we assume that for all instances where










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































missing values in data processing, we replaced these missing values with zero for all participants who did free-lists
tasks, but did not list honesty or dishonesty.
Again, as these lists were intended to be capped at a maximum of 5 items listed, these results should be interpreted
with caution. Moreover, recall that in some sites, few individuals listed (dis)honesty (see Table 5 in main text). This
may create by-site interpretations difficult. The R script nevertheless provides code for examining these differences.
Using the same model as mS4.1, but instead using item salience to predict game outcome, the order in which
individuals list honesty or dishonesty has an effect; on average, listing these items earlier predicts greater odds of
allocating coins to the distant cup. Note, however, that the effect is both better estimated and stronger for the
salience of dishonesty (mS4.3; and the model properly converged) than honesty (mS4.2). If this effect is real, it
suggests that how salient or accessible these items are matters in game outcome as well. In other words, how quick
individuals are to equate good and bad people with such virtues when prompted also plays an important role on
human behavior. With the aforementioned caveats in mind, these results suggest that conceptual salience matters in
the production of moral behavior.
These models failed to converge and have removed all cases with missing data. Nevertheless, the results suggest
that moral models, gods’ punishment and knowledge breadth increase the odds that players put a coin into the cup
reserved for geographically distant co-ethnic, co-religionists, qualitatively similar to the results reported in the main
text.
5.2. Varying only moral models across sites
5.2.1. Model specifications
Table S5 reports a variety of model specifications designed to examine in the role honesty and dishonesty specifi-
cally play as individual variables. Model 1 is based on a reduced model reported elsewhere [18]. Its main differences
from those models are: (1) here we use the imputed game check values for the Hadza, and (2) we ignore group-level
variation (i.e., it is a fully pooled model ignoring groups, but does vary intercepts for individuals). Model 2 is the
same basic model, but varies the intercept for individuals and field sites. Note that while the qualitative effects
are the same, there is a slight decrease in the odds ratio and a shift in the range of the confidence intervals for the
influence of moralistic gods’ punishment. This further emphasizes the importance of the effects of cross-site variation
in gods’ punishment values have on game outcome.
Model 3 builds on Model 2 by adding the summation of listing “honesty” and “dishonesty.” The model varies the
intercepts for both individuals (as the two game outcomes are repeated measures) and field sites. Though slight, the
content of individuals’ moral models does have an effect on allocations in the predicted direction; when individuals
report that “honesty” and “dishonesty” are indicative of moral or immoral people respectively, they have a greater
chance of allocating a coin to the distant co-ethnic, co-religionist. Though relatively slight, the effect remains stable
across model specifications.
Model 4 builds on Model 3 by varying the slopes by site for the honesty and dishonesty summation values. We
reasoned that when more people in these sites list honesty and dishonesty, individual allocations should more likely
go to the geographically distant players. In other words, individuals from communities where honesty and dishonesty
are more salient moral values should play more fairly. As such, the effect of group-level honesty and dishonesty should
vary across sites. The estimates of all simple effects are consistent with the other models.
Models 5-7 tease apart the free-list summations and include only “honesty” (Model 5), “dishonesty” (Model
6), and both as individual variables (Model 7). Across models, when someone lists honesty and/or dishonesty, the
chances of allocating a coin to the distant cup increases by ∼5%, the highest upper bound of the confidence interval
across these models was 19%.
5.2.2. Group-level projections
Based on Model 4 in Table S5, Figure S1 models the cross-site effects of listing honesty and dishonesty on the
probability of allocating a coin to the distant player. Baseline trends (modeled by the gray lines) are the logistic
transformed summations of the simple intercept coefficient (-0.42) and the coefficient for moral models (0.05) times
the possible moral model values (0, 1, or 2, therefore 0.40, 0.41, and 0.42 respectively). Hollow points are logistic
transformed summations of the simple intercept coefficient (-0.43), the site-specific intercept, the simple, individual-
level effect on moral models (0.05), and the by-site slope coefficients for moral models times their possible values of
0, 1, or 2. Defined in this fashion, these points model the group-level contributions of moral models: when x-axis
values are zero, this is akin to modeling the individual-level probability of giving to a distant individual when group
members mentioned neither honesty nor dishonesty on average; when x-axis values are two, this is akin to modeling















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































dishonesty. Solid points indicate where the site-specific mean of (dis)honesty summations are along the x-axis, placed
on the regression line for reference.
Two sites allocate coins far below sample-baseline allocations, the Hadza and Yasawans. Lovu Fijians and Tyvans
largely play fairly, as indicated by their values closer to 0.5 and having greater-than-baseline allocations overall. As
illustrated in Figure S1, the probability of Yasawan and Hadza allocations to the distant player would dramatically
increase as a function of increasing the group-level ubiquity of honesty and dishonesty in moral models. The Lovu
Fijians and Tyvans show barely noticeable effects, but they remain positive. In other words, compared to contexts
with low probabilities of allocating coins to distant players and infrequent cases of listing (dis)honesty, extrapolating
from this model adds little in the way of projection for contexts where honesty and dishonesty are already prevelent.
Nevertheless, it does show that increasing prevelence of (dis)honesty can have an impact on game play.
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